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. 
Finance and Inequality: Exploring Pro-Poor Investment Channels in Africa
Abstract
Hitherto  very few studies on the inequality-finance(investment) nexus have focused on 
the African continent owing to lack of relevant data. This paper integrates previously missing 
investment  and  financial  components  in  the  assessment  of  how  finance  affects  pro-poor 
investment  channels.  Findings  reveal,  but  for  the  case  of  foreign  investment,  financial 
development  dynamics  of  depth,  efficiency,  activity  and  size  have  an  equalizing  effect  on 
income  distribution  through  private,  public  and  domestic  investment  channels.  As  a  policy 
implication investment-targeted financial reforms that aim to curb poverty  should take account of  
the disequalizing income-effect of foreign investment in undeveloped countries. 
JEL Classification: D60; E25; G20; I30; O55
Keywords: Finance; Investment; Poverty; Inequality; Africa
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1. Introduction
Poverty remains stubbornly high in Africa and very few studies in the finance-inequality 
nexus have been dedicated to it, owing to scares and irrelevant data(Kai & Hamori,2009; Batuo 
et al.,2010). Poverty and inequality remain crucial challenges to economic growth and human 
development in the continent. In the 1980s and 1990s most African countries embarked on a 
series of structural and policy adjustments in the financial sector as part of overall economic 
reforms,  which  sort  to  improve  overall  economic  and  financial  sector  efficiency(Janine  & 
Elbadawi, 1992). For over three decades investment rates have fallen substantially in majority of 
African  countries(Ndikumana,  2002).  Given  the  close  connection  between  the  level  of 
investment  and  economic  growth(Barro,1991;  Ben-David,  1998)  and  the  pervasiveness  of 
financial repression in stifling economic growth ( McKinnon, 1973; Shaw,1973), this paper adds 
to  the  literature  by  investigating  how  finance  affects  income-inequality  through  investment 
channels. In plainer terms, it seeks to take stock of the income-redistributive effect of investment 
targeted financial reforms in the African continent. 
The rest of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 reviews existing 
literature. Data and Methodology are described and outlined respectively in Section 3. Empirical 
analysis and discussion of results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Theoretical outline
 
A bulk of empirical research presents two contrasting views on the impact of finance on 
income-inequality(hence  inequality).  Some  papers   posit  an  inverted  U-shaped link  between 
financial development and inequality. For instance, the Greenwood and Jovanovic(1990) finding 
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on the finance-growth-inequality nexus predicts a Kuznets curve relationship between finance 
and inequality.  Plainly put,  in the early stages of development  when the financial  sector is 
underdeveloped, inequality augments with financial development. However, this disequalizing 
impact reduces as the economy develops ; progressing to the intermediate phase and then to the 
mature phase of development where-in, agents would see their incomes increase as they gain 
access to the financial intermediary sector. In other words, in the  transition from a primitive 
slow-growing economy to a developed fast growing one, a nation passes via a stage in which the 
distribution of wealth across the rich and poor stretches. 
Another strand of authors suggest a linear relationship between financial development 
and income-inequality(Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Galor & Zeira, 1993). Their basic theoretical 
assumption is that financial market imperfections such as financial asymmetries, credit histories, 
transaction and contract enforcement costs could be very binding on the poor who are deficient 
of the collaterals, and relational networks. Therefore, even when the poor have projects with high 
returns, they may still be credit rationed, which infringes on the efficiency of capital allocation 
and limits the social mobility of the poor. Under these scenarios, income-inequality rises with 
financial development. Conversely, improvement of capital allocation efficiency would reduce 
income inequality by facilitating funding to  poor individuals with productive investment. 
2.2 Inequality and finance
 For clarity of  purpose, the relationship between finance and inequality can be classified 
into three main strands. 
The  first  strand  investigates  the  link  among  financial  development,  growth  and 
inequality.  Undernourishment(Claessens  & Feijen,  2006)  and  population  with  lower  income 
(Beck  et  al.,2007)  decrease  with  financial  development.  One  particular  worth  noting 
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characteristic  in  this  category  is  the  debate  on  the  benefits  of  financial  development.  Some 
authors  asserts that financial imperfections such as information and transaction costs are binding 
on  the  poor(who  lack  collaterals  and  credit  histories)  and  thus  a  relaxation  of  these  credit 
constraints  will  disproportionately  benefit  the  poor.  It  follows  that  amelioration  of  capital 
allocation efficiency would reduce income-inequality by facilitating funding to  poor individuals 
with productive investments( Galor & Zeira,  1993; Aghion & Bolton,  1997; Galor & Moay,  
2004). On the contrary, some theories postulate that financial development primarily helps the 
rich.  In  a  non  linear  relationship  between  finance,  income-inequality  and  economic  growth 
developed by Greenwood and Javanovic(1990), financial development does not benefit the poor 
at the tender stage of development.
In the second strand, we find literature that looks at unequal  access to and usage of 
finance. Whereas in developed countries, more than 90% of households gain access to financial 
services,  access to retail banking services is minimal in the poorer segments of the population in 
undeveloped countries, with fewer than one-quarter of households having access to even basic 
banking services(Honohan,2006). Low usage in lower-income countries proceeds in part from 
low  banking  sector  outreach.  As  regards  the  second  dimension  of  this  strand(access),  it  is 
important here to distinguish between financial depth and access to finance. As highlighted  by 
Claessens & Perotti (2007), numbers on the size of loans and deposits per capita are substantially 
higher  in lower income countries than in their higher income counterparts. The higher average 
loan and deposit values in lower income countries suggest that usage of formal banking services 
is restricted to firms and the relatively rich households. 
The third strand focuses on the effects of inequality in access to finance.  Absence of 
equal opportunities in access to finance may prompt corruption(Berger & Udell,1998), slower 
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firm growth(Ayyagari et al.,2006; Beck et al.,2005), reduction in entrepreneurial activities and 
lack of convergence in growth rates between rich and poor countries(Banerjee & Duflo, 2005), 
diminish individual welfare gains such as reduction in the prevalence of hunger, poor health, low 
education and gender income-inequality(Claessens & Feijen, 2007). 
We have seen from available evidence that financial access is quite skewed and affects 
competition,  individual  welfare  and  enterprise  growth.  The  lack  of  diffused  access  can 
undermine growth, reduce welfare and create vulnerability to financial meltdown. It is worth 
investigating  why  financial  sector  reforms  have  not  been  targeted  at  improving  access  to 
financing. The second category of the literature  assesses this concern with natural and political  
perspectives. 
2.3  Why  inequality in access to finance? 
Hitherto, we have observed  that financial systems provide unequal access to households 
and firms. For organizational purposes unequal access to finance could be naturally economic or 
due to political influences.
Natural  economic  reasons  include  high  fixed  cost  in  offering  financial  services  and 
barriers   created  by  entry  regulations  that  serve  a  valid  public  good(e.g.  identification 
requirements for opening up a bank account to maintain financial integrity). It is as a result of 
financial  market  frictions  that  the  poor  cannot  invest  in  their  education  despite  their  high 
marginal productivity of investment(Galor & Zeira, 1993; Banerjee & Newman, 1993).
Unequal  access  could  be  the  result  of  political  influence  which  creates  regulatory 
obstacles  to  protect  established  rents(  Rajan  & Zingales,  2003;  Acemoglu  et  al.,2005).  This 
means countries with poor political institutions, naturally leads to unequal political influence. 
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Powerful groups will affect the regulatory and judicial environment and frequently control the 
allocation of finance(directly through bank ownership or via political networking). 
 
2.4 The experience and lessons of financial reform
For clarity in presentation it is worthwhile classifying literature on financial reform( in 
the context of inequality and resulting lessons), into three main categories.
In the first strand, we find papers focused on the timing and  experience of financial 
liberalization  in  developing  and developed countries  over  the  past  two decades(Henry,2003; 
Chinn  &  Ito,2006).  We  see  evidence  especially  at  individual  firm  level,  that  domestic 
deregulation and liberalization have augmented the supply of domestic capital, attracted foreign 
capital, led to more relaxed financial constraints…etc. All these have led to growth at investment 
and  economic  levels.  Capital  market  liberalization  specifically  on  average,  have  appealing 
effects  on  growth,  asset  allocation  and  efficiency(Levine  and  Zervros,1996;  Henry,2000a; 
Henry,2000b; Henry,2006). 
The second strand concerns  literature  pertaining  to  asset  allocation,  rents  and growth 
opportunities.  Here,  we  find  works  substantiating  that  reforms  often  profit  insiders  through 
preferential  allocation  of  assets,  rents  and  growth  opportunities.  The  cases  of  Chile  in  the 
1970s(Velasco,  1988;  Valdes-Prieto,1992),  Mexico  in  the  1980s(Haber  & Kantor,  2004;  La 
Porta et al.,2003; Haber et al.,2003) and Russia in the 1990s( Claessens & Pohl,1995; Perotti, 
2002) attest how privatization of state owned banks benefits groups of insiders. We also find 
evidence of preferential allocation of licenses to a few insiders(Clarke et al.,2003),  profits of 
stock  market  liberalization  that  have  been  directed  only  to  the  top  quintile  of  the  income 
distribution(Das and Mohapatra,2003), listing and corporate governance rules often designed to 
help insiders(Khwaja & Mian, 2005) and lastly, evidence suggesting that  poor regulation and 
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weak  enforcement  in  the  liberalization  markets  allowed  insiders  ample  space  for  the 
expropriation of minority shareholders(La Porta et al.,2000; Claessens et al.,2002). In this strand 
we also find evidence that, while financial openness generally improves capital allocation and 
investment  at  the micro  level(Henry,2003),it  does  not  always  translate  into higher  economic 
growth at the aggregate level.
Literature on allocation of risks created by financial reforms constitute the third strand. 
Bank  crises  typically  increase  inequality(Galbraith  &  Lu,  1999)  because  turmoil  can  be 
socialized(Dooley,2000). Financial crises also profit the lower-income strata through looting by 
the poor who have  nothing to lose(Akerlof & Romer, 1993). In the redistributive impact of crisis 
through  politics,  Glaeser  et  al.(2003)  argue  that  in  many  countries,  the  political  answer  to 
institutional subversion by the rich is not institutional reform, but rather a form of massive Robin 
Hood redistribution. In some circumstances, this backlash slows economic and social progress 
on the one  hand and on the other hand, the effect could simply be a change in the elite. In many 
cases  reforms  are  often  opportunistic,  geared  towards  political  ends;  most  notably  during 
elections(Dinc,2004; Brown & Dinc,2004). 
2.5 Finance and Inequality in Africa
Studies on the finance-inequality nexus are relatively absent in the context of Africa due 
to scares and lack of relevant data on inequality. In a first detailed econometric analysis, Kai and 
Hamori(2009)  examine  the  link  between  financial  deepening  and  inequality  in  sub-Saharan 
Africa between 1980 and 2002 and find that financial depth helps mitigate inequality. 
 Batuo et al.(2010) investigate the manner in which financial development is related to 
income distribution in  a panel of 22 African countries for the period  between 1990 and 2004.  
Using  a  dynamic  panel  estimation  technique(GMM),  results  indicate  that  income  inequality 
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decreases as economies develop their financial  sectors. They are consistent with the bulk  of 
theoretical(Galor & Zeira, 1993; Banerjee & Newman, 1993) and empirical(Beck et al.,2004; 
Beck  et  al.,2007;  Kai  &  Hamori,  2009)  research  in  finding  no  evidence  confirming   the 
Greenwood-Javanovic(1990) hypothesis of an inverted U-Shaped relationship between financial 
development and inequality. 
The main contribution of this paper to the finance-inequality literature is the introduction 
of  previously  missing  investment  and  financial  components,  such  that  financial 
development(reform) is used fundamentally as an instrument. This will enable the analysis to 
capture  the  effects  of  financial  dynamics  of  depth,  efficiency,  activity  and size  on  income-
inequality through domestic, foreign, public and private investment channels. This innovation 
with an instrumental variable approach to the analysis has the advantage of assessing how the 
first and second generation investment-targeted financial reforms in the African continent have 
influenced income-distribution. 
3.  Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
We  examine  a  sample  of  thirteen  African  countries(Algeria,  Botswana,  Cameroon, 
Egypt,  Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa,  Swaziland, Tanzania and 
Uganda)  with  data  obtained  from  African  Development  Indicators(ADI)  and  the  Financial 
Development  and  Structure  Database(FDSD)  of  the  World  Bank(WB).  Due  to   scarcity  of 
inequality data in ADI of the WB, we borrow from Kai and Hamori (2009) and use estimated 
household  income  inequality  data  obtained  from  the  University  of  Texas  Inequality 
Project(UTIP). The sample of countries are those for which data is available from the UTIP and 
which have not experienced a civil  war during the period 1980-2002. The time interval  also 
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coincides  with  the  two  decades  of  structural  adjustment  and  policy  reforms  in  the  African 
continent. The variables as summarized in Appendix 3 could be classified into the following 
categories.
3.1.1 Financial development instrumental indicators
a) Financial depth
Whereas recent finance-inequality literature  has either not used financial depth(Beck et 
al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007)  or  focused only on a single measure of  financial development( Kai 
& Hamori, 2009;Batuo et al.,2010), we borrow from  Beck et al.(1999) and Asongu(2011a), and 
proxy  financial  depth  both  from   overall-economic  and  financial  system  perspectives  by 
indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. 
The  former represents the monetary base plus demand, saving and time deposits, while the later 
denotes liquid liabilities. The two indicators are  in ratios of GDP(see Appendix 3) and  should 
robustly  check each other  as  either  accounts  for  over  97% of  information  in  the  other  (see 
Appendix 2).
b) Financial efficiency
The  concept  of  efficiency  here  is  neither  profitability-oriented  nor  guided  by  the 
production  efficiency  of  decision  making  units  in  the  financial  sector  (through  Data 
Envelopment  Analysis:  DEA).  What  this  paper  seeks  to  address  is  the  ability  of  banks  to 
effectively  fulfill  their  fundamental  role  of  transforming  mobilized  deposits  into  credit  for 
economic  operators.  We  use   indicators  of  banking-system-efficiency  and  financial-system-
efficiency (respectively ‘bank credit  on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial  system credit  on 
financial  system  deposits: Fcfd’).  Like  for  financial  depth,  these  two  financial  allocation 
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efficiency proxies can check each other as they represent more than 88% of variability in one 
another (see Appendix 2).
c) Financial size
In accordance  with the FDSD we measure  financial  intermediary size as the ratio of 
“deposit bank assets” to the “total assets” (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit 
bank assets: Dbacba). Unfortunately, we could not find another measure of financial size despite 
a thorough search, numerous computations and deepened correlation analyses.
d) Financial activity
Financial  intermediary  activity  here  refers  to   the  ability  of  banks  to  grant  credit  to 
economic operators: consistent with first and second generation  African reforms of the 1980s 
and  1990s  respectively  which  were  aimed  at  stimulating  investment.  Whereas  past  works 
highlighted in the literature  have focused only on a single measure(Beck et al.,2004; Beck et  
al.,2007;Batuo et al.,2010)  we proxy for both  bank-sector-activity  and financial-sector-activity 
with “private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb” and  “private credit by domestic banks and 
other  financial  institutions:  Pcrbof”  respectively.  The  later  measure  checks  the  former  as  it 
represents more than 91% of information in the former (see Appendix 2).
3.1.2 Investment variables
The study uses Gross  Domestic  Investment,  Foreign Direct  Investment,  Gross Public 
Investment and Gross Private Investment as instrumental variables. The choice of these variables 
is  based  on  the  finance-inequality  literature,  where-in  financial  reforms  were  investment-
targeted.
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3.1.3 Control Variables
In accordance with the finance-growth(Levine & King, 1993; Hassan et al., 2011) and 
finance-inequality(Dollar  & Kraay ;Beck et  al.,2007;  Kai  and Hamori,  2009)   literature,  we 
control for trade, population growth, government expenditure and GDP growth.
3.1.4  Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis are covered in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 
respectively. From the descriptive statistics, it could be observed that an estimation approach that 
directly assumes a particular form of distribution is inappropriate and would produce biased and 
inconsistent estimates. As for the correlation analysis, it has two principal objectives. On the one 
hand it enables the paper avoid issues linked to multicolinearity and overparametization. On the 
other hand, it provides the work with a foresight on possible relationship-signs between various 
indicators.  Among  them,  it  is  worth  noting  that  all  correlations  with  the  variable  of 
interest(income-inequality) have the right signs. While population growth is positively correlated 
with  inequality,  the  remaining  variables  are  negatively  correlated  with  it.  These  negative 
correlations are in accordance with theory in the perspective that financial sector reforms (depth, 
efficiency,  activity  and  size)  are  designed  to  reduce  income-inequality  through   aggregate 
investments(domestic,  foreign,  private  and  public).  As  for  population  growth,  its  positive 
association with the variable of interest results from its diminishing impact on household per 
capita income. 
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3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Endogeneity
Although the lack of financial access has long been recognized as the leading cause of 
persisting inequality,  Claessens & Perotti(2007) have urged the need to recognize the reverse 
effect as well.  They borrow from  Acemoglu & Robison (2005) and highlight that inequality 
affects financial development and in particular the distribution of access because unequal access 
to  resources  affects  de  facto  political  power.  In  accordance  with  the  literature(  Rajan  & 
Zingales,2003; and Perotti & Volpin, 2007) in a weak institutional framework where de facto 
political  influence  dominates  de  jure  political  representation,  inequality  renders  it  easy  for 
established interests to influence access to finance by direct control or regulatory capture of the 
financial system.   
3.2.2 Estimation technique 
Siding  with  Beck  et  al.(2003)  we  employ  the  Two-Stage-Least  Squares(TSLS)  with 
financial dynamics as instrumental variables. As we have emphasized  earlier, the paper requires 
an  estimation  technique  that  takes  account  of  endogeneity.  The  Instrumental  Variable(IV) 
estimator can avoid the bias that Ordinary Least Squares(OLS) estimates suffer-from(absence of 
consistency) when independent variables are correlated with the error term in the equation of 
interest. Another appeal worth pointing-out is the close relation between investment and finance 
in  effects  of  financial  reforms;  which  provides  another  justification  for  the  use  of  financial 
dynamics as instrumental variables. Thus the IV model assesses if financial dynamics of depth, 
efficiency,  activity  and  size  affect  income-inequality  through  domestic,  foreign,  private  and 
public investment channels. Borrowing from Asongu(2011bd) the TSLS process of the paper 
shall adopt the following steps:
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-justify  the  use  of  a  TSLS  over  an  OLS  estimation  technique  via  the  Hausman-test  for 
endogeneity;
-show  that  instrumental  variables  (financial  intermediary  dynamics  )  are  exogenous  to  the 
endogenous  components  of  explaining  variables  (investment  channels),  conditional  on  other 
covariates(control variables);
-verify if the financial instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the equation 
of interest through an Over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test. 
Thus the above methodology will include the following models:
First-stage regression: 
++= itit FinDepthChannelInvestment )(10 γγ +itncyFinEfficie )(2γ ityFinactivit )(3γ  
                               itFinsize)(4γ υα ++ itiX                                                                              (1)
Second-stage regression:
++= itit ChannelInvestmentInequality )(10 γγ +itiXβ µ                                                          (2) 
In the two equations,  X is a set of independent variables that are included in first-stage 
regressions. For the first and second equations,  v  and u, respectively represent the error terms. 
Instrumental variables are the four financial intermediary  dynamics.  
3.2.3 Robustness of results
To assess the robustness of our results we: (1) use Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Consistent(HAC)  standard  error  regressions  to  check  every  model;  (2)  control  for  the 
consistency of financial channels with alternative instrumental indicators;  (3) check restricted 
with unrestricted regressions at the Second-stage of the TSLS approach. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Inequality and Finance
This section presents results from cross-country regressions to assess the importance of 
financial  dynamics  in  explaining  cross-country variances  in  income-inequality,  the ability  of 
financial dynamics to explain cross-country differences in aggregate investments and the ability 
of the exogenous components of investment to account for cross-country differences in income 
distribution. 
In Table 1, we regress the estimated household income inequality indicator on financial 
intermediary  dynamics  of  depth,  efficiency,  activity  and  size  and  also  test  for  their  joint 
significance. We avoid simultaneous involvement of financial aspects of depth and activity in the 
same regression due to issues of muliticolinearity and overparametization. Our use of alternative 
indicators  in  each  financial  channel(but  for  financial  size)  provides  a  robust  account  of  the 
validity in ‘significance and sign’ of estimated coefficients. The results in Table 1 show that 
distinguishing  countries  by  financial  dynamics  helps  explain  cross-country  differences  in 
income-inequality.  These findings have been documented by an extensive literature  (Beck et 
al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007; Kai & Hamori, 2009;Batuo et al.,2010) and recently confirmed from 
an inequality adjusted human development perspective by Asongu(2011c). Even after controlling 
for population and GDP growths, financial intermediary dynamics enter jointly significantly in 
all regressions(see third to the last line of Table 1 on Fisher-test significance). At least judging 
from empirical literature, we expected negative signs for the channels of  financial depth (Kai & 
Hamori, 2009;Batuo et al.,2010) and financial activity (Beck et al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007;Batuo 
et al.,2010). As for financial efficiency and size, we cannot firmly establish with certainty the 
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right signs as this work is the first to use them in finance-inequality literature.  However, by 
virtue of correlation analysis we expected their estimated coefficients to have negative signs.  
Table 1: Inequality and Finance regressions 
Dependent Variable: Estimated Household  Income Inequality 
Mod. 1 Mod.1* Mod.2 Mod.2* Mod.3 Mod.3* Mod.4 Mod.4*
Constant 48.88*** 47.16*** 43.47*** 43.93*** 45.86*** 44.53*** 40.37*** 40.50***
(38.15) (37.94) (32.92) (31.78) (23.18) (22.66) (21.66) (20.80)
Instruments
Financial 
Depth
Monetary
Base
-13.2*** --- --- --- -12.4*** --- --- ---
(-7.828) (-7.130)
Liquid 
liabilities
--- -13.9*** --- --- --- -12.7*** --- ---
(-6.815) (-5.938)
Financial 
Efficiency
Banking S. 
Efficiency
-2.68*** --- 2.148** --- -3.40*** 1.100 ---
(-3.039) (2.359) (-3.717) (1.149)
Financial S.
Efficiency 
--- -1.282* --- 2.806*** --- -1.692** --- 1.862*
(-1.829) (3.009) (-2.335) (1.900)
Financial 
Activity
Banking S. 
Activity
--- --- -19.5*** --- --- --- -18.4***
(-7.286) (-6.76) -9.087***
Financial S. 
Activity
--- --- --- -10.4*** --- --- --- (-4.169)
(-4.888)
Financial 
Size
Dbacba 4.885** 4.92** 6.175*** 2.216 6.661*** 6.210*** 8.189*** 4.094*
(2.579) (2.419) (3.028) (1.088) (3.389) (2.971) (3.917) (1.947)
Control  Variables
Popg --- --- --- --- 0.968** 0.822** 1.079*** 1.125***
(2.443) (2.024) (2.708) (2.710)
GDPg --- --- --- --- -0.154* -0.129 -0.173** -0.118
(-1.939) (-1.588) (-2.132) (-1.396)
Fisher  test 20.83*** 15.87*** 18.06*** 8.32*** 14.49*** 10.75*** 13.41*** 6.90***
Adjusted R² 0.219 0.171 0.196 0.092 0.243 0.186 0.229 0.121
Number of  Observations 213 216 211 216 211 214 209 214
Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit bank assets. Popg: Population growth rate. GDPg: GDP growth rate. *,**,***:  
Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Mod:Model. S:system. 
4.2 Investment and Finance
Table  2 assesses  whether  financial  dynamics  explain  cross-country differences  in  the 
indicators which characterize the investment channel. We regress proxies of domestic, foreign, 
private and public investments on the financial instrumental dynamic variables. While Panel A 
concerns domestic and foreign investments, Panel B focuses on private and public investments. 
We report the Fisher-test of whether the instruments taken together explain significantly cross-
country variations in the investment channels. Clearly,  financial dynamics help explain cross-
country variations in the investment channels, as the F-test for the joint significance of these 
instruments is significant at the 1% level in all regressions. 
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Table 2: First-Stage  Investment-Finance regressions 
Panel  A: Domestic and Foreign Investments
Domestic Investment Foreign Investment
Mod.5 Mod.5* Mod.6 Mod.6* Mod.7 Mod.7* Mod.8 Mod.8*
Constant 8.790*** 10.13*** 11.08*** 10.65*** 0.701 0.333 0.471 -0.032
(3.883) (4.576) (5.575) (5.446) (1.458) (0.733) (0.991 (-0.050)
Instruments
Financial 
Depth
Monetary
Base
13.29*** --- --- --- -1.37** --- --- ---
(7.216) (-2.31)
Liquid 
liabilities
--- 13.04*** --- --- --- -1.76** --- ---
(5.859) (-2.51)
Financial 
Efficiency
Banking S.
Efficiency
-1.481 --- -4.70*** --- -1.21*** --- -0.89** ---
(-1.499) (-4.534) (-3.388) (-2.55)
Financial S.
Efficiency 
--- -3.09*** --- -6.12*** --- -0.89*** --- -0.969***
(-3.924) (-6.165) (-3.029) (-2.88)
Financial 
Activity
Banking S. 
Activity
--- --- 12.05*** --- ---- --- -2.31** ---
(4.338) (-2.44)
Financial S. 
Activity
--- --- --- 7.518*** --- --- --- -1.23*
(3.410) (-1.661)
Financial 
Size
Dbacba 7.520*** 9.333*** 5.59** 8.800*** 1.262 1.653* 1.63* 2.77***
(3.493) (4.268) (2.538) (4.262) (1.463) (1.790) (1.75) (3.948)
     Control  Variables 
Trade --- --- --- --- 0.010*** 0.009** 0.012*** ---
(2.615) (2.267) (2.983)
G.E --- --- 0.393*** 0.439*** --- --- --- 0.028
(3.782) (4.289) (0.821)
Popg 0.832* 0.899* --- --- --- --- --- ---
(1.816) (1.963)
GDPg 0.255*** 0.192** 0.286*** 0.220** 0.106*** 0.102*** --- ---
(2.797) (2.120) (3.020) (2.412) (3.532) (3.438)
Fisher test 20.35*** 19.03*** 16.20*** 18.62*** 12.88*** 12.368*** 12.28*** 7.674***
Adjusted R² 0.277 0.261 0.233 0.256 0.200 0.191 0.159 0.099
Number of  Observations 253 256 251 256 238 241 238 243
Panel  B: Private and Public Investments
Private Investment Public Investment
Mod. 9 Mod. 9* Mod.10 Mod.10* Mod. 11 Mod.11* Mod. 12 Mod.12*
Constant 4.684*** 5.831*** 6.362*** 6.676*** 6.165*** 6.253*** 9.265*** 7.923***
(3.626) (4.683) (4.911) (5.101) (4.284) (4.414) (7.084) (5.193)
Instruments 
Financial 
Depth
Monetary
Base
4.082*** --- --- --- 7.819*** --- --- ---
(2.611) (6.495)
Liquid 
liabilities
--- 3.194* --- --- --- 7.646*** --- ---
(1.728) (5.374)
Financial 
Efficiency
Banking S. 
Efficiency
1.563* --- 0.091 --- -0.898 --- -2.764*** ---
(1.865) (0.107) (-1.493) (-4.159)
Financial S.
Efficiency 
--- 0.510 --- -0.499 --- -1.58*** --- -3.085***
(0.724) (-0.588) (-3.287) (-4.482)
Financial 
Activity
Banking S. 
Activity
--- --- 7.01*** --- --- --- 6.852*** ---
(2.993) (3.848)
Financial S. 
Activity
--- --- --- 2.840 --- --- --- 3.928***
(1.471) (2.612)
Financial 
Size
Dbacba 5.57*** 6.383*** 4.625** 6.753*** -3.92*** -2.626* -3.822** -1.733
(2.584) (2.754) (2.057) (2.951) (-2.798) (-1.842) (-2.578) (-1.156)
Control Variables 
Trade 0.025** 0.020** 0.026*** 0.020* --- --- --- ---
(2.498) (1.973) (2.640) (1.947)
G.E --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.059 0.078
(0.884) (1.140)
Popg --- --- --- --- 0.407 0.473* --- 0.120
(1.430) (1.660) (0.399)
GDPg --- --- --- --- --- -0.046 ---
(-0.764)
Fisher test 13.49*** 11.38*** 14.25*** 11.14*** 13.44*** 11.58*** 5.414*** 5.035***
Adjusted R² 0.167 0.141 0.176 0.138 0.169 0.146 0.083 0.075
Number of  Observations 250 253 248 253 245 248 242 248
Dbacba:  Deposit  bank  assets  on  Central  bank  assets  plus  Deposit  bank  assets.  Popg:  Population  growth  rate.  GDPg:  GDP growth  rate.  G.E:  
Government Expenditure. *,**,***: Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Mod:Model. S:system.
17
It is worth noting this is the first-step of the TSLS approach where-in, the instruments  
must be exogenous to the endogenous components of the investment channels, conditional on 
other covariates(control  variables).  The signs of estimated coefficients are broadly consistent 
with recent findings(Asongu,2011d). All significant control variables also have the right signs. 
4.3 Restricted TSLS regressions
Table 3 addresses two main issues: (1) the concern of whether the exogenous components 
of investment  channels  explain income-inequality conditional  on financial  dynamics  and; (2) 
whether  financial dynamics explain income-inequality beyond  investment channels. To make 
these investigations we use the TSLS regressions with financial instrumental variables . Thus we 
integrate equation (2) into the first-stage regressions (first equation). Whereas  the first issue is 
addressed  by  the  significance  of  estimated  coefficients,  the  second  is  investigated  by  the 
overidentifying  restrictions  (OIR)  test  whose  null  hypothesis  posits  that,  the  instruments 
(financial channels) are not correlated with the error term of the equation of interest (equation 
2).Therefore, a rejection of the null hypothesis of the OIR test is a rejection of the position that 
financial  dynamics  explain income-inequality only through investment  channels.   Robustness 
checks are done at three stages: (1) the use of alternative indicators of each financial instrumental 
dynamic as expressed by the last two columns of tables 3 and 4; (2) the application of alternative 
models with Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors(HAC)  captured 
by models with the “*” indication; (3) introduction of an(a) autonomous(constant)  investment 
measure in the regressions when the OIR test rejects its null hypothesis.
Table 3 reveals restricted TSLS inequality regressions. We first justify our choice of a 
TSLS estimation method with a Hausman test for model specification. The null hypothesis of 
this test is the view that estimated coefficients by OLS are not consistent; implying they suffer  
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from endogeneity because the exogenous variables in the equation of interest are correlated with 
the  error  term.   Should   the  Hausman  test  fail  to  reject  the  null  hypothesis  (absence  of 
endogeneity) we do not consider  the TSLS estimation method appropriate because estimates by 
OLS are efficient and consistent. With OLS, we find strong evidence of endogeneity in all eight 
regressions.  Conditional  on  the  nature  of  identification  (difference  between  instruments  and 
endogenous regressors) we report the weak instrument test of first-stage regressions with Cragg-
Donald  statistics.  Owing  to  issues  of  multicolineatity  and  overparametization  we  do  not 
simultaneously use domestic and private investments in the same regression. 
The  first  issue  is  addressed  by  the  significance  of  investment  channel  estimated 
coefficients. With regards to the second concern, rejection of the null hypothesis of the OIR test 
in all  eight regressions shows that,  financial  channels do not explain income-inequality only 
through investment channels. Therefore the instruments are correlated with the error term in the 
equation of interest; indicating the financial dynamics do not address the concern of endogeneity 
(which affect investment channels). The presence of biased estimates due to endogeneity can be 
further  confirmed  by  the  signs  of  estimated  coefficients.  At  least  judging  from  theoretical 
postulations(Galor  &  Zeira,1993;  Banerjee  &  Newman,1993),  empirical  literature(Beck  et 
al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007; Kai & Hamori, 2009;Batuo et al.,2010) and to some extend common-
sense,  we  expect  financial  dynamics(instruments)  to  diminish  income-inequality  through 
aggregate  investment  channels.  Indeed  this  was  the  vision  of  first  and  second  generation 
financial reforms in sampled countries.  The findings in Table 3 are also antagonistic with our 
initial  expectations from correlation analysis; where-in all investment channels are negatively 
correlated with income distribution. Given the invalidity of these instruments under a restricted 
TSLS  hypothesis,  we  relax  the  restriction  assumption  and  suppose  the  presence  of  an(a) 
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autonomous(constant)  level of investment.  Therefore we replicate the regressions in Table 3 
with an unrestricted TSLS approach presented in Table 4. 
Table 3: Finance, Inequality and Restricted Investment with HAC
Dependent Variable: Estimated Household  Income Inequality
Model 13 Model 13* Model 14 Model 14* Model 15 Model 15* Model 16 Model 16*
Investment
Channels
Domestic --- --- 1.775*** 1.775*** 1.988*** 1.988*** --- ---
(12.26) (4.480) (6.585) (3.321)
Foreign --- --- 6.488** 6.488*** 6.826** 6.826 9.463*** 9.463
(2.342) (0.873) (2.493) (0.949) (3.273) (1.233)
Private 2.644*** 2.644*** --- --- --- --- 2.188*** 2.188***
(11.15) (13.24) (6.201) (4.669)
Public 1.301*** 1.301*** --- --- -0.625 -0.625 1.023 1.023
(2.649) (2.717) (-0.776) (-0.441) (1.559) (0.852)
Hausman test 370.782*** 370.782*** 322.413*** 322.41*** 390.22*** 390.22*** 522.58*** 522.58***
OIR(Sargan) test 49.050*** 49.050*** 44.388*** 44.388*** 33.484*** 33.484*** 18.336*** 18.336***
P-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Weak Instrument test(F) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Cragg-Donald 12.017 --- 3.106 --- 3.017 --- 4.017
Adjusted R² 0.156 0.156 0.058 0.058 0.028 0.028 0.020 0.020
F-Statistics --- --- --- --- 367.62*** 69.718*** 273.38*** 56.220***
Observations 202 202 199 199 191 191 191 191
Instruments Constant, Money Supply, Banking System activity, Banking system Efficiency, Financial size  
Robustness Instruments Constant, Liquid Liability, Financial System Activity, Financial  System Efficiency, Financial size  
():  z-statistics.  Chi-square statistics for Hausman test.  LM statistics for Sargan test.  [ ]:p-values. Cragg-Donald Weak Instrument test.  *,  **,  ***:  
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Models with the “*” are in Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent(HAC) standard  
errors(HAC). 
4.4 Unrestricted TSLS regressions
Borrowing from the analytical approach expressed for  Table 3, Table 4 addresses the 
two  main issues. Firstly, the rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test  in all eight 
regressions  validates  the  TSLS  estimation  method.  While  the  significance  of  estimated 
coefficients address the first concern, the second issue is fully addressed by the OIR test in six of 
the eight regressions. Failure to reject its null hypothesis in models 18 to 20 shows that financial 
channels  do  not  explain  the  redistributive  effect  of  income   beyond  aggregate  investment 
mechanisms in the presence of autonomous investment(constant). This confirms the instruments 
are  valid  and  the  issue  of  endogeneity  is  no  longer  relevant  as  the  instrumental  financial 
dynamics are not correlated with the error term in the unrestricted equation of interest. Results 
indicate, while domestic, public  and private investments have a redistributive impact of reducing 
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income-inequality,  foreign  investment  does  the  contrary.   This  finding  on  foreign  direct 
investment  is  consistent  with  the  investment-inequality  literature(Pan-Long,1995;  Basu  & 
Guariglia,2007).  In  a  recent  study   where  foreign  direct  investment  is  the  proxy  for 
globalization(Kai & Hamori,2009), its disequalizing effect depends on the level of development 
in the country; in line with theoretical postulations(Greenwood and Jovanovic ,1990).
Table 4: Finance, Inequality and Unrestricted Investment with HAC
Dependent Variable: Estimated Household  Income Inequality
Model 17 Model 17* Model 18 Model 18* Model 19 Model 19* Model20 Model 20*
Constant 58.682*** 58.682*** 54.429*** 54.429*** 52.449*** 52.449*** 54.697*** 54.697***
(21.68) (12.97) (13.82) (8.928) (12.70) (8.260) (13.23) (9.718)
Investment
Channels
Domestic --- --- -0.640*** -0.640** -0.438* -0.438 --- ---
(-3.404) (-2.293) (-1.864) (-1.278)
Foreign --- --- 4.146*** 4.146* 3.926*** 3.926* 2.931*** 2.931**
(3.084) (1.849) (3.111) (1.822) (2.788) (2.076)
Private -0.591*** -0.591** --- --- --- --- -0.553** -0.553*
(-3.537) (-2.263) (-2.343) (-1.830)
Public -0.902*** -0.902** --- --- -0.307 -0.307 -0.803*** -0.803***
(-4.840) (-2.295) (-0.840) (-0.640) (-3.190) (-2.861)
Hausman test 14.928*** 14.928*** 48.567*** 48.567*** 49.072*** 49.072*** 39.059*** 39.059***
OIR(Sargan) test 16.775 16.775 2.376 2.376 1.952 1.952 2.479 2.479
P-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.304] [0.304] [0.162] [0.162] [0.115] 0.115]
Weak Instrument test(F) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Cragg-Donald 11.45 --- 3.869 --- 3.749 --- 3.666 ---
Adjusted R² 0.160 0.160 0.026 0.026 0.020 0.020 0.059 0.059
F-Statistics 15.972*** 4.651** 8.687*** 3.464*** 6.059*** 2.283* 9.038*** 4.592***
Observations 202 202 199 199 191 191 191 191
Instruments Constant, Money Supply, Banking System activity, Banking system Efficiency, Financial size
Robustness Instruments Constant, Liquid Liability, Financial System Activity, Financial  System Efficiency, Financial size
(): z-statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM statistics for Sargan test. [ ]:p-values. Cragg-Donald Weak Instrument test. *, **, ***: 
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Models with the “*” are in Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent standard errors(HAC).
5. Conclusion
Due to lack of data on income-inequality in Africa, very few studies on the inequality-
finance(investment)  nexus  have  focused  on  the  continent(Kai  &  Hamori,  2009;Batuo  et 
al.,2010). While these papers have limited their  analysis  to a few financial  development and 
investment  indicators,  the  need  for  a  more  detailed  analysis  motivated  this  paper.  Thus  the 
present work has contributed to existing literature by integrating previously missing investment 
and financial components in analyzing the inequality-finance nexus for the African continent. In 
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order  to  assess  the  income-redistributive  effects  of  first  and  second  generation  investment- 
targeted financial reforms of the 1980s and 1990s  respectively,  we investigate how financial 
dynamics  of  depth,  efficiency,  activity  and  size  have  affected  income-inequality  through 
domestic,  foreign,  private  and  public  investment  channels.  But  for  the  case  of  foreign 
investment,  financial  development  has  an  equalizing  effect  on  income  distribution  through 
investment channels. This is broadly consistent with theoretical( Galor & Zeira,1993; Banerjee 
& Newman,1993) and empirical(Beck et al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007; Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo 
et al.,2010) literature. The disequalizing effect of foreign  investment also respects theoretical 
postulations(Greenwood and Jovanovic ,1990) and depends on the level of development in the 
country(Kai  &  Hamori,  2009)  with  respect  to  the  hypothesis  of  an  inverted   U-shaped 
relationship. 
As  a   policy  implication  financial  reforms  that  target  poverty  reduction  at  the  early 
development  stage  in  a  country  should  focus  on  private,  public  and domestics  investments. 
However  when  a  country  is  mature  in  development  terms,  then  financial  reforms  favoring 
globalization through foreign direct investment will be pro-poor. 
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis Obser.
Income Inequality(EHII) 45.128 5.140 29.033 64.360 -0.224 0.905 247
Domestic  Investment(GDI) 21.829 7.069 5.608 43.406 0.399 -0.003 288
Foreign Investment(FDI) 1.213 2.067 -7.125 10.294 1.338 4.383 275
Private. Investment(Priv.I) 13.607 5.234 2.303 34.516 0.146 0.301 281
Public Investment(Pub. I) 6.840 3.900 0.000 22.149 0.825 0.587 276
Openness(Trade) 69.245 36.366 22.303 205.13 1.409 1.312 289
Government Expenditure(G.E) 16.101 4.501 6.971 31.554 0.554 0.438 287
Population growth(Popg) 2.603 0.867 0.670 6.238 0.253 1.673 299
GDP growth(GDPg) 3.978 4.181 -10.240 19.450 0.109 1.399 286
Money Supply(M2) 0.377 0.212 0.046 0.830 0.589 -0.836 288
Liquid Liabilities(Fdgdp) 0.305 0.182 0.026 0.742 0.574 -0.840 286
Banking   Efficiency(BcBd) 0.766 0.407 0.070 2.259 1.070 1.274 294
Financial Efficiency(FcFd) 0.855 0.492 0.139 2.606 1.514 2.201 286
Banking Activity(Pcrb) 0.227 0.167 0.011 0.698 0.975 0.143 281
Financial Activity (Pcrbof) 0.269 0.238 0.011 1.325 1.996 4.844 288
Financial Size(Dbacba) 0.741 0.198 0.110 0.999 -0.702 0.238 273
S.D: Standard  Deviation.  Min : Minimum. Max : Maximum.  Obser : Number of  observations.
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            Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix 
Investment  Variables Control  Variables
Instrumental  Variables Income
InequalityFin.  Depth Fin.  Efficiency Fin. Activity F. Size
GDI FDI Priv.I Pub. I Trade G.E Popg GDPg M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba EHII
1.000 0.090 0.587 0.430 0.338 0.391 -0.154 0.226 0.402 0.354 -0.074 -0.148 0.225 0.075 0.316 -0.297 GDI
1.000 0.089 0.024 0.358 0.057 0.007 0.318 -0.047 -0.060 -0.208 -0.198 -0.158 -0.153 0.123 -0.022 FDI
1.000 -0.168 0.313 0.208 -0.217 0.120 0.218 0.200 0.134 0.107 0.296 0.189 0.365 -0.271 Priv. I
1.000 0.085 0.210 -0.001 0.055 0.251 0.185 -0.202 -0.270 0.011 -0.125 -0.104 -0.161 Pub. I
1.000 0.392 -0.215 0.308 0.026 0.074 -0.072 -0.129 0.001 -0.084 0.502 -0.041 Trade
1.000 0.084 0.077 0.017 0.004 0.084 0.132 0.087 0.145 0.271 -0.021 G.E
1.000 0.041 -0.420 -0.458 0.096 0.068 -0.286 -0.231 -0.357 0.211 Popg
1.000 -0.042 -0.053 -0.195 -0.208 -0.146 -0.170 0.031 -0.041 GDPg
1.000 0.976 -0.081 -0.011 0.693 0.563 0.306 -0.413 M2
1.000 -0.054 0.052 0.744 0.642 0.391 -0.375 Fdgdp
1.000 0.883 0.507 0.455 0.343 -0.060 BcBd
1.000 0.621 0.716 0.370 -0.055 FcFd
1.000 0.915 0.527 -0.366 Pcrb
1.000 0.494 -0.242 Pcrbof
1.000 -0.073 Dbacba
1.000 EHII
GDI: Gross Domestic Investment. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Priv.I: Private Investment. Pub.I: Public Investment. Trade: Openness. G.E: Government Final Expenditure. Popg: Population  
growth rate. GDPg: GDP growth rate. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. Pcrb: Private  
domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus deposit bank assets.  
EHII: Estimated Household Income Inequality. Fin: Financial.  
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Appendix 3: Variables definitions
Variables Sign Variable Definitions Sources
Income Inequality EHII Estimated Household Income Inequality UTIP, Kai and Hamori 
(2009)
Domestic Investment GDI Gross Domestic Investment (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Foreign Investment FDI Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Private Investment Priv.I Gross Private Investment (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Public Investment Pub.I Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Openness Trade Imports(of goods and services) plus 
Exports(of goods and services) on GDP
World Bank(WDI)
Government Expenditure G.E General Government Final Consumption 
Expenditure (% of GDP)
World Bank(WDI)
Population growth Popg Average annual population growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Growth of GDP GDPg Average annual GDP growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Economic financial 
depth(Money Supply)
M2 Monetary Base plus demand, saving and 
time deposits 
World Bank(FDSD)
Financial system 
depth(Liquid liabilities)
Fdgdp Financial system deposits  World Bank(FDSD)
Banking system 
allocation efficiency
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank(FDSD)
Financial system 
allocation efficiency
FcFd Financial system credit on Financial 
system deposits 
World Bank(FDSD)
Banking system activity Pcrb Private credit by deposit banks World Bank(FDSD)
Financial system activity Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions 
World Bank(FDSD)
Financial size Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central banks 
assets plus deposit bank assets
World Bank(FDSD)
GDI: Gross Domestic Investment. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Priv.I: Private Investment. Pub.I: Public Investment. Trade: Openness. G.E: 
Government Final Expenditure. Popg: Population growth rate. GDPg: GDP growth rate. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: 
Bank credit on Bank deposits.  FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits.  Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks.  
Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus deposit  
bank assets. EHII: Estimated Household Income Inequality. WDI: World Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure  
Database. UTIP:  University of Texas Inequality Project.
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